People v Brenda WW
Issues: DVSJA standard of review and PRS requirement under the DVSJA.
Facts: In 2008, Brenda was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to 20 years for killing her abusive husband. She filed a DVSJA motion in 2020, the lower court denied it, finding that a broken nose, push down the stairs, and neck stomping (among other things) were not substantial abuse. The Third Department reversed, finding the abuse substantial, and noting that neither her substance abuse nor her criminal history were impediments to the compassionate relief of the DVSJA. The Third Department resentenced Brenda under the DVSJA to 8 yrs + 5 yrs PRS. Brenda had already served 15 years in prison, so the Third Department held that the 7 excess years of prison counted as credit to satisfy her 5 years PRS. The People appealed, arguing that the Appellate Division reviewed the DVSJA decision de novo, but should be limited to abuse of discretion review. They also argued that the Third Department should not have credited her excess prison time toward PRS.
Held: The Court of Appeals affirmed the grant of DVJSA resentencing but remitted the case to the Appellate Division for further proceedings concerning the PRS term.
The Court held that the Appellate Division’s plenary factual review power allows it to review DVSJA decisions de novo and to reverse DVSJA denials without finding an abuse of discretion. Because the Third Department’s factual findings were supported by the record, the Court of Appeals had no basis to disturb them.
The majority (Wilson) also held that the DVSJA requires resentenced survivors to serve a term of PRS. The Court remitted the case to the Appellate Division for further proceedings, surmising that in imposing the maximum PRS term, the AD may have been influenced by the erroneous belief that Brenda would not in fact serve any time on PRS.
Singas and Troutman dissented on the PRS issue. As an initial matter, the dissent found the PRS challenge unpreserved. Further the dissent believes the majority to be confusing the duty to impose PRS with the execution of PRS. The former is the duty of the court. The latter is a sentencing calculation traditionally left to DOCCS. If the People wanted to challenge it, they should have done so via a CPLR article 78 petition where, unlike here, DOCCS would be a party. Despite assurances that the Court’s PRS holding is limited to DVSJA resentencings, the dissent warned that it could be applied to identical language in other PRS provisions, making it “likely [to] impact the calculation of sentences in other resentencing circumstances.” The dissent also found that requiring successful DVSJA applicants to serve PRS contravenes the DVSJA’s remedial purpose to redress excessive punishment for survivors of domestic violence, since community supervision “mimic[s] the abusive relationships that domestic violence survivors experienced…prior to incarceration.”
CAL observes: It is rare that we find ourselves more aligned with Singas than Wilson, but here we are. Hopefully, Wilson knows that it is DOCCS’ call to determine how someone’s sentence will be calculated. I suspect his issue was with the fact that the Third Department said the quiet part out loud and made that calculation on DOCCS’ behalf, and even went so far as to discuss why PRS was not necessary despite being required by law. No word yet on what happened on remittal.