People v. Scott
Issue before the Court: Does a court’s gross overstating the maximum possible sentence render the plea unknowing and involuntary?
Held: Yes, under the totality of the circumstances. And, neither preservation nor a 440 motion is required.
Discussion: The judge repeatedly told Mr. Scott that he was looking at 15 years’ incarceration on each of the three counts of second-degree burglary he was charged with, which could run consecutively for a term up to 45 years’ incarceration. The six-to-eight year sentence, therefore, was a bargain that Mr. Scott was willing to take. Unbeknownst to Mr. Scott – or, apparently, the judge or the attorneys – his exposure was “capped” at 20 years by Penal Law § 70.30(1)(e)(i).
The issue that split the Court was not about the unknowing nature of the plea – clearly it was – but whether such a claim needed to be preserved. Ordinary, plea withdrawal claims require preservation but an exception exists “where a defendant has no practical ability to object to an error” (Peque (2013); Louree (2007)). The majority relied on Diaz, one of the companion cases in Peque, where the court provided wrong information about the deportation consequences, and distinguished Williams (2016), where the court was unsure about the individual’s minimum sentence. Because Mr. Scott had no reason to question the court’s statement about his sentencing exposure, he had no opportunity to object and, therefore, preservation was not required. Had the judge questioned whether consecutive sentences were possible or whether the aggregate sentence could necessarily be that high, the majority indicated that preservation of the claim would have been required.
CAL observes: The Court majority (of 5) dickered with the dissent (Singas and Garcia) for a remarkable 35 pages over preservation, not the substantive merits. The merits are simple: The court blatantly coerced a plea from a 23-year-old first-felony offender by threatening him with having to spend four-and-a-half decades in prison for three burglaries when, in fact, Mr. Scott was not facing even half that amount of time. The preservation question is really about who to blame. The dissent would have forced Mr. Scott to bring a C.P.L. § 440.10 motion asserting ineffective assistance of counsel (for not knowing or correcting the court about the sentencing range) in order to prevail. The majority casts this as the court’s problem, though notably the court had no affirmative obligation to discuss the sentencing range or the maximum possible sentence. Once it decided to do so, it assumed the obligation of providing correct information.
The majority asserts that determining sentencing ranges is easy. It’s not. New York sentencing law is hopelessly complex with few people knowing the capping rules and even fewer knowing how to combine consecutive or concurrent sentences or to determine the parole eligibility date, the conditional release date, or the maximum expiration date for combined felony sentences. Yet, this is undoubtedly the most important information for an individual deciding to plead guilty. In our view, the parties and the court should be obligated to put their understandings on the record, so that discrepancies can be resolved and accurate information conveyed. Simply put, an individual ought to know his sentencing range before pleading guilty.