People v. Collier, 2026 WL 519592026, N.Y. Slip Op. 00074 (Jan. 8, 2026)

Issue Presented: Did a nearly six-year delay between the registrant’s plea to a registrable offense and his SORA risk-level hearing violate his substantive due process rights?

Held: No; the registrant failed to establish that the delay “prejudiced his ability to present his case to the SORA court.”

Discussion:

In an opinion authored by Judge Garcia, and joined by Judges Rivera, Singas, Cannataro and Troutman, the Court affirmed the First Department’s holding that Mr. Collier’s substantive due process rights were not violated when his SORA hearing was not held (and he was not informed he had to register) until nearly six years after his conviction. In doing so, the majority declined to adopt the multi-part test used by the intermediate appellate court to reach its decision, finding instead that the only relevant consideration was whether Mr. Collier was prejudiced by the delay insofar as it concerned his ability to defend himself at the ultimate hearing. Chief Judge Wilson concurred in the outcome and authored a concurrence that was joined by Judge Halligan.

In April 2009, Mr. Collier was convicted of a misdemeanor sex offense and sentenced to one year in jail. At the time of his plea, he was informed that he was required to pay a $1,000 “sex offender fee,” but not of his obligation to register (nor was he certified as a “sex offender” at his sentencing as is required by Correction Law § 168-d(1)). No SORA hearing was held before or immediately after his unconditional release from jail in December 2009.

Five years later, in November 2014, the NYS Sex Offender Registry realized that Mr.

Collier had been convicted of a registrable offense but not assigned a risk level. It notified the Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders which then prepared a recommendation that was transmitted to the Supreme Court in which Mr. Collier’s conviction originated, and a risk-level hearing was calendared. Mr. Collier moved to dismiss the proceeding (or, in the alternative, eliminate community notification), asserting that the five-plus-year delay violated his federal and state due process rights. The court rejected the arguments and proceeded with the hearing, adjudicating Mr. Collier a Level 1 registrant and running its order nunc pro tunc from Mr. Collier’s release from jail (effectively crediting him with five years on the registry when he was not actually registered). On appeal, the First Department affirmed the lower court’s decision, applying a modified version of the Taranovich factors to determine whether the delay was constitutionally permissible.

In reaching its determination that Mr. Collier’s substantive due process rights were not violated, the majority focused on whether, at his eventual risk-level hearing, Mr. Collier was prejudiced. It rejected outright the application of the Taranovich factors because of the “civil,” and not penal, nature of SORA. The majority emphasized the diminished nature of a registrant’s liberty interest in a SORA proceeding as compared to a defendant in criminal proceedings and highlighted at length the various due process protections registrants are afforded in New York. As all of those protections were afforded to Mr. Collier in advance of his hearing, the only consideration the Court found relevant to its substantive due process analysis was whether Mr.

Collier suffered any prejudice at the hearing. Since the passage of time led the SORA court to reject points sought by the Board and prosecution, resulting in the imposition of the lowest risk level, and Mr. Collier was given credit for the time that had elapsed, the majority found no prejudice had been established. Finally, the majority rejected the notion that Mr. Collier’s “expectation that he would not be required to register as a sex offender” could or did “crystallize” into a protected liberty interest.

Concurring in the outcome, Chief Judge Wilson, joined by Judge Halligan, wrote separately to articulate why a longer delay, or a case where a higher risk level was set, might warrant a different outcome. In his opinion, Chief Judge Wilson emphasized the ways registration does impact Mr. Collier, seemingly rejecting the majority’s effort to minimize the liberty interest implicated by SORA.

CAL Observes:

It was not surprising that the Court was unwilling to vacate someone’s registration requirement due to government inaction, particularly given the emphasis the Court has typically places on the special (i.e., harsh) treatment those convicted of sexual misconduct can receive because of the “public safety” purpose of SORA. It was disappointing to see five judges, including Judge Rivera, sign on to an opinion that seemed unconcerned about the impact of registration on individuals even when they are assigned the lowest risk level. On a more promising note, Judge Halligan again endorsed a position more (relatively) sympathetic to registrants, indicating that she may be more open to future appeals by registrants than others on the Court. Finally, it bears noting that Chief Judge Wilson included in his concurrence a recognition that, in other states, a trend is emerging where registration is being seen for what it is really is—punishment. It does not appear the full court is ready to go there just yet but one can hope the tide continues to shift in that direction.