People v. Leighton R. (decided November 25, 2025)

Issue Before the Court: Does Aguilar-Spinelli, or some other standard, apply when assessing reasonable suspicion for an automobile stop based on an anonymous 911 caller’s contemporaneous report that they were the victim of a crime?

Factual Background: An anonymous person called 911 to report that they’d just been shot by two Black men in a white Mercedes-Benz. The caller gave his location in the Bronx and provided the address for one of the shooters. The 911 dispatcher then broadcasted the report of shots fired with the location and a description of the suspects and their vehicle. A cop at the location, however, immediately responded by noting that no shots had been fired.

After hearing the broadcast, another cop who was about four blocks away drove to the shooting location. Within 30 seconds to a minute of the broadcast, he saw a white Mercedes matching the description of the shooters’ vehicle coming from the direction of the shooting. He then stopped the vehicle, asked for the driver’s (Leighton R.) license, and asked where he was coming from. Leighton stated he was coming from a baby shower in Mount Vernon.

During the stop, through the 911 caller, the dispatcher informed the cop of the shooter’s home address and that the shooting happened in Mount Vernon, not the Bronx. The address on Leighton’s license matched the alleged shooter’s address.

Leighton told the cop that he “can check the car” when asked if there was anything in the car the cops should know about. Upon pulling the handle of the locked glove compartment, the cop saw a handgun and smelled gunpowder through a “gap.” Based on that, he unlocked the glove compartment and found a handgun and ammunition, leading to Leighton’s arrest. The 911 caller was never found.

The suppression court upheld the stop. It reasoned there was reasonable suspicion based on the proximity of the car to the alleged shooting within moments of the 911 call and the cop’s observations corroborating the caller’s description of the suspects. The search was voluntarily consented to, and the view of the handgun and smell of gunpowder gave probable cause to search the glove compartment. The First Department affirmed on the same bases.

Held: Aguilar-Spinelli analysis only applies to probable cause determinations. Totality of the circumstances applies to reasonable suspicion. And, because there was record support for finding reasonable suspicion for the stop and probable cause to search the glove compartment, those rulings are affirmed.

CAL Observers: This is a five-judge majority opinion authored by Judge Cannataro. The majority reasoned that this holding reconciles its precedent on the issue following the Supreme Court’s decisions in Gates (applying a totality analysis in the probable cause context); White (applying a totality analysis in the reasonable suspicion context; and Navarette (deemphasizing the need for “predictive information” it emphasized in

J.L.).

The majority relies heavily on its decision in Argyris, where it found reasonable suspicion for a car stop based on the police’s confirmatory observations of noncriminal information provided by an anonymous caller—rather than predictive information suggestive of criminality. It characterized Argyris as a retreat from the “predictive information” the Court had found necessary to showing a tipster’s knowledge and reliability under Aguilar-Spinelli in the reasonable suspicion context. This decision completes that retreat and seemingly justifies the less-protective standard because reasonable suspicion is also a lower standard.

However, the Court claimed not to abandon Aguilar-Spinelli completely. It kept Aguilar-Spinelli for the probable cause context, and noted that its basis of knowledge and reliability prongs are still relevant to reasonable suspicion as factors to be considered—they’re just not the only factors. The test now is whether an anonymous tip is sufficiently reliable, under the totality of the circumstances, to provide reasonable suspicion. Although that test may give the prosecution more facts to pull from, it does the same for the defense. Practitioners should additionally tie their reliability arguments to the concerns that animated the Court to keep Aguilar-Spinelli in the probable cause context (e.g., preventing intrusions based on rumor, ill-intent, etc.). The Court noted that those concerns are still critical.

The Court also expressly left open whether a vehicle stop would be valid after any report of a completed offense. For example, even if reliable, an anonymous tip of a crime may not justify a car stop if the tip isn’t contemporaneous to the crime.

Judge Rivera, joined by Chief Judge Wilson, dissented. She reasoned that the Court’s precedent is clear, as a majority of the Argyris Court expressly applied Aguilar-Spinelli to the reasonable suspicion analysis. She emphasized that the same concerns leading the Court to keep Aguilar-Spinelli as a matter of State constitutional law apply to reasonable suspicion, and the majority guts the most important factor—predictive information of criminality. There were no reliable indicia of criminality here, only general benign information about the suspects’ car, race, and gender; she clarifies that the majority wrongly suggested the cop knew more than that at the time of the stop.